

ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE, AND DECISIONMAKING
PROCEDURES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE, AND DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1983

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS IN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY FORMULATION

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John Tower (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Tower, Thurmond, Goldwater, Warner, and Quayle.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; Alan R. Yuspeh, general counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel; Willis D. Smith, deputy staff director and chief scientist for the minority; Ann E. Sauer, special assistant; Michael B. Donley, Richard D. Finn, Jr., George K. Johnson, Jr., James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, Bruce D. Porter, and Arnold L. Punaro, professional staff members; Drew A. Harker, research assistant; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson and Toni D. White, staff assistants.

Also present: Dennis P. Sharon, assistant to Senator Goldwater; John G. Campbell, assistant to Senator Warner; Ronald P. Kelly, assistant to Senator Humphrey; James H. Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Jon Etherton, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Henry J. Steenstra, assistant to Senator Quayle; and Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets this morning for the 11th in its series of hearings on the organization of the Department of Defense.

Today we shall consider the issue of interaction between the Defense Department and other Federal agencies in the formulation of national security policy. We are all aware that the National Security Council, the State Department, the Intelligence Community, the Office of Management and Budget, and various advisers to the President are integrally involved in the formulation of national security policy. Our committee is interested in whether the present system for the formulation of this policy is sound or whether adjustments in that system are necessary.

We are greatly honored to have with us this morning two former national security advisers. Both have had distinguished careers and have made substantial contributions to our country.

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski is presently the Herbert Lehman Professor of Government at Columbia University and a senior adviser to the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University. He served as the national security adviser from 1977 to 1981.

Dr. Brzezinski has written broadly on numerous foreign affairs and national security subjects. His most recent book is an excellent and provocative discussion of his years in the Carter administration.

Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft is presently the chairman of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces. He served as the national adviser from 1975 to 1977. General Scowcroft also served as deputy national security adviser and as military adviser to the national security adviser. He previously had a distinguished career as an Air Force officer.

I would invite Mr. Brzezinski and General Scowcroft to speak generally about the national security decision process, and about any changes in that process which they think are required. In addition, should either of you have any views on the Defense Department organization issues that we have been considering, we would certainly welcome your opinion on those matters as well.

Before we hear from Dr. Brzezinski, Senator Goldwater, do you have any comment to make?

Senator GOLDWATER. No; just to add my welcome.

Chairman TOWER. Gentlemen, you may submit your statements in their entirety for the record and summarize them in your oral presentation, you may submit any data or documents or material you want and we will incorporate that in the record.

In any case, you may proceed as you see fit. I will first call on Dr. Brzezinski.

STATEMENT OF DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Mr. Chairman and Senator Goldwater, I have submitted some material to be introduced into the record, but I would like to make a brief initial comment, if I may.

The national security decisionmaking system at the highest level is and should be a creature of the personal style of the President himself.

It would be a mistake so to formalize the process as to inhibit the President's freedom to operate in a manner that is most congenial to him. To be effective, the system and the process must be responsive to the President's felt needs and to his personal predilections.

Some Presidents tend to be activists in foreign affairs, deeply immersing themselves in the day-to-day process of making decisions and even foreign negotiations; others prefer to delegate such responsibilities, monitoring from above the broad strategic directions.

In the former case—as, for example, under Presidents Nixon and Carter—decisionmaking comes automatically to be concentrated in the White House; in the latter case, for example, Presidents Eisenhower and Reagan, decisionmaking tends to be more dispersed. It would be

idle to attempt to impose on every President an identical and rigid structure.

Nonetheless, certain improvements are possible and desirable. The comments which follow focus on three questions raised by your staff and are not meant to be an overall blueprint. However, they do make some suggestions aiming at the rationalization of the existing structure without doing violence to the principle of flexibility dictated by varying Presidential styles.

The position of the assistant for national security affairs should be redesignated to that of director of national security affairs and made subject to senatorial confirmation.

The point of this reform would be to make real power into legitimate authority. Over the last decade two activist Presidents—Nixon and Carter—determined to control personally the substance of decisionmaking, used their assistants for national security affairs in various ways that seemed to infringe on the traditional roles of the Secretary of State. The Presidents did so because they felt the need to do so. Yet the exercise of such functions by the national security advisers was seen by many as an illegitimate usurpation of the authority of the Secretary of State.

However, the fact is that only from the White House could effective coordination and integration of foreign policy writ large, that is, diplomacy, defense and intelligence, be achieved. No self-respecting Secretary of Defense would allow himself to be coordinated by the Secretary of State, or vice versa.

Moreover, the remedy cannot be found in attempting to turn the clock back; in today's world effective coordination can only come from the White House, and activist Presidents will inevitably rely on their immediate associates for the projection and articulation of the Presidential perspective.

Even under less than activist Presidential leadership, power tends to gravitate also the NSC from State, as it did lately, despite the fact that the national security adviser was not as intensely engaged in the substance of policy as some of his predecessors. That further underlines the need for facing up to the inevitability of White House preponderance in the shaping and coordination of our national security policy.

The proposed change, which would parallel the system existing already in our national economic policy, would make the director of national security affairs the legitimate and acknowledged coordinator and, if need be, also the President's spokesman on national security affairs.

He would perform a similar role to that of the Director of OMB, providing greater cohesion to the system. Formal authority and de facto power would finally be linked.

Senatorial confirmation would also create the basis for a more regularized and open relationship with Congress. Our national security policy currently is articulated through departmental spokesmen, who tend to stress the respective perspectives of diplomacy, defense, or intelligence. The frequent result is the absence of a wider and more coherent vision.

The argument that senatorial confirmation would limit the President's freedom to choose his man to fill that sensitive spot does not stand up.

Newly elected Presidents particularly are given considerable leeway in the choice of their associates, and it is a fair guess that almost all of the previous incumbents in the post of assistant to the President for national security affairs would have easily obtained senatorial confirmation.

At the same time, senatorial insistence on a higher standard for the incumbents would certainly not be damaging to Presidential prerogatives or to the national interest.

I attach a fuller case for the proposed reform, to be made part of the record.

A strategic planning board, composed of senior interagency officials, should be attached to the NSC, to formulate longer term national security policy.

Currently, planning to the extent that any even exists is undertaken within specific departments. Our ability to shape a long term national security policy would be enhanced by the creation in the NSC of a board of relatively senior officials from the pertinent departments, delegated to shape through an interagency process the strategic goals of our policy.

Such a body existed in the NSC under President Eisenhower. In its absence, a longer term vision is either occasionally shaped by strong-minded individuals who happen to be serving either as the national security adviser or as the Secretary of State or, more often, there is simply the lack of a broader and integrated strategy.

Such a strategic planning board should be composed of senior officials deliberately drawn from the Departments of State, Defense, the CIA, and the military service, as well as perhaps also the Treasury, ACDA, and USIA.

Working with and for the director of national security affairs, such an interagency group of senior officials, with each possessing practical experience in relevant policy issues, could be quite helpful in shaping the much-needed wider and longer term perspective.

For example, the widespread public concern over our current Middle Eastern policy reflects a felt absence of a coherent and understandable U.S. strategy for dealing with the Middle Eastern problem in a manner that serves U.S. national interests.

Insofar as the deliberations of the NSC itself are concerned, it is immaterial whether the Chairman of the JCS is made a statutory member.

The NSC as a deliberative council of the President's senior advisers, in contrast to its daily staff role, meets under the President's chairmanship, he consults with it; but he alone decides what should be done.

In practice, attendance at the formal NSC meetings is at the President's discretion, and discussion is equally open to the statutory and nonstatutory members. The President calls upon those whose views he wants to hear.

There is no vote and no de facto distinction between participants. Thus the views of the Chairman of the JCS are heard as much as the President wishes to hear them.

The issue, therefore, should be judged not in terms of the JCS contribution to the NSC deliberations as such, but rather in terms of the relationship between the Chairman of the JCS and the Secretary of Defense.

While I strongly favor the reforms proposed by Gen. David Jones for the enhancement of the role and status of the Chairman of the JCS, I would be concerned over changes which dilute the authority of the Secretary of Defense as the President's principal officer on defense matters.

Accordingly, on this issue I would defer to the judgment of the current and previous Secretaries of Defense.

Let me conclude these initial remarks with a final thought: National security policy is a term which embraces diplomacy, defense strategy, foreign intelligence, international economics, and even the conflict of ideas.

To be shaped effectively, it requires integration not only of the traditional departments, but also of historical experience with the latest information, and of the President's domestic political needs with the requirements of our external interests.

One should have no illusions that this process can be managed effectively from the vantage point of one of the traditional departments. This is why the substantive enhancement and the formal legitimation of the NSC process is needed.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The article by Dr. Brzezinski follows:]

[From the New York Times (Magazine) Sept. 18, 1983]

DECIDING WHO MAKES FOREIGN POLICY

A FORMER HEAD OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ARGUES THAT PRIMACY IN THE AREA OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DOES NOT BELONG WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(By Zbigniew Brzezinski)

If one thing should have been made clear by George P. Shultz's current stewardship as Secretary of State, it is that the besetting problem of who makes foreign policy is not the product of a conflict of personalities. The issue, as posed in recent years, is whether primacy in the area belongs in the State Department or in the National Security Council (N.S.C.). When Henry Kissinger headed the N.S.C. in the Nixon White House, it was alleged to be his ego and his taste for the Machiavellian that kept the Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, out of the center of things. When I occupied the same White House post under President Carter, it was said that my instinct for the jugular gave the N.S.C. an excessive share of foreign-policy initiatives, at the expense of Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance.

Yet in Mr. Shultz and the current N.S.C. chief, William P. Clark, we have two men who, to all appearances, enjoy a relationship untroubled by ego trips in either direction. Indeed, Mr. Clark is generally perceived as not deeply involved in the complex substance of key foreign issues. Nonetheless, in recent months, the press has noted that influence has been gravitating away from the experienced Mr. Shultz to the able but relatively inexperienced Mr. Clark. Surely that speaks for itself, suggesting that the problem that has bedeviled a succession of Presidents is not one of individuals but of organization.

What is the proper arrangement for the shaping of United States foreign policy? The traditional answer—that the policy should be molded by the Secretary of State—seems to have been proving increasingly inadequate. It would appear that the old formula can no longer cope either with the challenges we face abroad or with the distribution of power in Washington among key agencies involved in promoting national security—of which foreign policy is a part.

This institutional difficulty has, in fact, been perennial in the modern age. For many years, the main struggle over foreign policy was between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. It was only later that public attention shifted to the conflicts between the Secretary of State and the national security adviser.

Of course, the personal element does enter into it, as it does into every human endeavor. A reading of the various relevant memoirs of recent years leaves little doubt that personal conflict did affect the relationship between Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Rogers, although one cannot discern very profound policy differences between them. There was also evidence of conflict, occasionally intense, between Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. and the former national security adviser Richard V. Allen; again, policy disagreements do not seem to have played a significant role. During the Carter years, the situation was somewhat different. I have denied many times that there was any personal conflict between me and Mr. Vance. But there were occasions when we had rather dissimilar views on policy issues.

These differences, personal or substantive, tend to spill over and produce wider interagency conflicts. And recent years have seen a full measure not only of the traditional conflict between the State and Defense Departments but of the newer conflict between State and the N.S.C. for pre-eminence in the making of foreign policy.

Control over turf is a very important bureaucratic asset. Institutions tend to fight over areas of responsibility as much as over policy. And policy differences or personality conflicts between principals tend to intensify and accentuate institutional conflicts over turf. Currently, there is a new phenomenon in the area of foreign policy. I call it "parcelization," a term used in rural economics to describe the dividing up of land holdings into smaller parcels—and, progressively, into still smaller ones.

Today, the making of foreign policy involves a pronounced degree of parcelization. Take the Middle East. There was a period when the State Department had preeminence in this region, but lately the initiative seems to have passed to the White House. A new Presidential negotiator for the Middle East, Robert C. McFarlane, has been plucked out of the N.S.C. to assume more direct personal responsibility for this area of nonactivity.

On Central America, policy is apparently under White House control, exercised primarily by the national security adviser, Mr. Clark, though he does not have any extensive experience in Central American problems. The State Department appears increasingly to be playing a secondary role, while the Defense Department and the C.I.A. actively promote their own special ventures.

On Far Eastern questions, and particularly in the relationship with China, the action seems to be primarily dominated by the Defense and Commerce Departments, with the State Department playing a secondary role.

On Europe, the State Department appears able to maintain its traditional predominance in the more conventional areas of United States-European relations, such as diplomacy and defense policy. At the same time, however, the shaping of our relations with Europe is being increasingly shared with the Commerce Department and the President's special trade representative.

On arms control, there appears to be a three-way split. The State Department seems to be playing a major role in shaping our proposals and defining our negotiating strategy on secondary levels, for the Secretary of State does not seem to be too interested or well versed in the intricacies of this problem. Lately, even this secondary responsibility has come to be shared increasingly with the Defense Department. On a higher conceptual level, the job of framing some long-term consensus on our arms-control and strategic policies has been given to a special bipartisan commission of experts drawn from public life.

In the making of national security policy, we have, in effect, a chaotic nonsystem. And that nonsystem, I think, reflects some of the persistent institutional problems that have eluded solution in recent years. Where, then, does the solution lie?

To start with, it is important to remember that the position I had the privilege of holding in the White House carries two titles. The formal one is Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The informal title, not to be found in any Governmental document or legislative act, and yet widely used by the press and by Presidents themselves, is that of national security adviser. And these two titles encapsulate the two roles that these close associates of the President have tended to perform.

As Assistant for National Security Affairs, the incumbent is meant to be an objective and detached processor of key issues. He is supposed to define these issues and present them for Presidential decisions, integrating for the President the views of the State and Defense Departments and the C.I.A. He is also called upon to prepare the basis for an objective analysis of the problems involved if there is dispute between the affected agencies.

But the second and unofficial title—national security adviser—implies something more. It means that the occupant of this post is indeed an adviser to the President, and thus a subjective participant in this allegedly objective process. He is supposed to make choices and influence the President's decisions.

There is bound to be some conflict between these roles, and some occasional confusion. And there are bound to be situations in which the national security adviser steps on other people's toes. You will recall that at different times in recent years, national security advisers have acted as spokesmen for the President—even, occasionally, as secret negotiators.

It should be borne in mind, however, that when they did so, whether it was Mr. Kissinger or myself, it was with a Presidential mandate, at the President's specific request. This is explicitly stated in Mr. Nixon's and Mr. Carter's memoirs. Yet the performance of these tasks by the national security adviser inevitably generated public dispute and was, by and large, perceived in Washington as an illegitimate usurpation of the rightful prerogatives of the Secretary of State.

This view of the national security advisers' activities was personally damaging not only to the advisers but, sometimes, to the Presidents they served. Mr. Nixon resolved the dilemma by appointing Mr. Kissinger as Secretary of State. Mr. Carter's similar dilemma was resolved by the American electorate. Yet the issue remains.

There are three basic reasons why certain tasks dealing with foreign policy in its national security context can best be carried out by the national security adviser. First, there is the increasing intermeshing of diplomacy, intelligence and defense. You cannot reduce national security policy only to defense policy, or only to diplomacy. Secretaries of State all too often confuse diplomacy with foreign policy, forgetting that diplomacy is only a tool or foreign policy, and that there are other tools, including the application of force.

Thus, integration is needed, but this cannot be achieved from a departmental vantage point. No self-respecting Secretary of Defense will willingly agree to have his contribution, along with those of other agencies, integrated for Presidential decision by another departmental secretary—notably, the Secretary of State. And no self-respecting Secretary of State will accept integration by a Defense Secretary. It has to be done by someone close to the President, and perceived as such by all the principals.

Second, decisionmaking in the nuclear age is almost inevitably concentrated in the White House. So many of the issues have an ultimate bearing on national survival, so many crises require prompt and immediate response, that a Presidential perspective on these matters has to be maintained and asserted. It cannot be done from the vantage point of a department.

Third, foreign policy and domestic politics have become increasingly intertwined. The time when foreign policy could be viewed as an esoteric exercise by a few of the initiated is past. Today, the public at large, the mass media, the Congress, all insist on participating in the process, and that makes coordination at the highest level all the more important.

In searching for a remedy to the problem in all its aspects, we must recognize that the elimination of conflict is an idle dream. Conflict is bound to exist whenever a number of individuals are engaged in a decisionmaking process, whenever a number of institutions project different institutional perspectives. So some conflict is unavoidable and is bound to be with us, enlivening and, one hopes, enlightening our lives. But some tempering of conflict is possible. And, in that respect, it would be useful to look at our national experience in two other areas of decisionmaking.

The first is national defense. In fighting World War II, we managed without formal, institutional integration of decisionmaking. The war was conducted by the War Department and the Navy Department on the basis of some informal institutional arrangements—notably committees established by the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. George C. Marshall, with President Roosevelt's approval.

But the war taught us that this situation could not endure; the response was the coordination of civil and military decisionmaking under the National Se-

curity Act of 1947. That act created a body, the National Security Council, with statutory membership limited to the President's immediate associates. In practice, attendance was somewhat wider, and initially included the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, as well as the three service Chiefs of Staff, along with the Secretary of State and the holder of the newly created post of Secretary of Defense—all under the chairmanship of the President.

Additional reforms over the next few years centralized the system further. The service Secretaries and the service Chiefs were removed from the N.S.C. That left the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff another new post, as the only authoritative voices in the N.S.C. to defense matters. The service Secretaries were removed from the Cabinet as well, leaving the Secretary of Defense as the sole authoritative voice on defense matters at that level. A unified approach was adopted in defense budgeting.

These moves toward more centralized control evoked enormous opposition. Yet who today would suggest that the position of the Secretary of Defense be abolished, and that we go back to a situation in which defense policy was shaped by three Secretaries, each representing a different service, each fighting for his own budget, each shaping that budget and its strategic priorities within his own department?

There has been a similar evolution in the area of economic and fiscal policy. Until 1921, all departments and agencies at the United States Government made special, separate requests for funds to Congress. They did so directly, with copies to the President. It was only in 1921 that the Bureau of the Budget was made an agency, within the Treasury Department, responsible to the President, and the various departments were forbidden to ask Congress directly for money.

In 1939, on the eve of World War II, the Bureau of the Budget was transferred from the Treasury Department to the Executive Office of the President. In 1970, the Bureau of the Budget became the Office of Management and Budget in order to support the President in the exercise of managerial control over all Government departments. And in 1974, the appointment of a Director of the Office of Management and Budget was made subject to confirmation by the Senate.

Would anyone claim today that the existence of such a director inhibits the effective shaping of our national economic policy? Would anyone argue that the Secretaries of Commerce or of the Treasury cannot perform their functions because of the existence of such an arrangement?

I believe we must face up to the need for similar reforms for better coordination and integration of our national security policy. The first step, in my judgment, ought to be to upgrade the office of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by redesignating it as the office of the Director of National Security Affairs, comparable to the post of Director of the Office of Management and Budget. This would give it the status and authority it requires for the coordination of national security recommendations as they emanate from the State and Defense Departments and from the C.I.A.

Second, the appointment of the Director of National Security Affairs should be made subject to Senate confirmation. Only such a process would create a formal position fully legitimized in its functions. In such a setting, it would be clear that the Secretary of Defense is responsible for defense, that the head of the C.I.A. is responsible for intelligence, that the Secretary of State is responsible for diplomacy, while integrating the work of these three agencies into comprehensive national security policy is the responsibility of the Director of National Security Affairs.

Indeed, the clarification of the role of the Secretary of State as specifically responsible for diplomacy could, in time, open the way to yet another highly desirable step—the appointment of the first Secretary of State from the ranks of the professional Foreign Service. For then the Secretary of State would be clearly seen as professionally responsible for the task of managing our diplomacy, but would not be mistakenly perceived—as he has been in recent years—as a would-be architect of overall foreign policy, with its large security dimension.

Last but not least, I believe that such an arrangement would permit a more reasonable and effective relationship between our national security policy and our legislative branches. Under existing arrangements, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is inhibited from appearing before Congress, since his testimony is viewed as an intrusion on the rightful prerogatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense. Once his appointment is subject to Senate confirmation, his appearance before legislative bodies would be normal and customary. He would be in a position to articulate our national policy on the President's behalf.

In effect, in the area of national security, we would be adopting an arrangement analogous to the arrangements developed earlier for national defense and the national economy. It would not resolve conflict altogether; it would not prevent divisions; but it would create a structured and orderly system in the central area of policy making—that of national survival.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Dr. Brzezinski. That is a very fine statement.

General Scowcroft?

**STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. BRENT SCOWCROFT, U.S. AIR FORCE
(RETIRED), FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER**

General SCOWCROFT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do not have a formal statement, Mr. Chairman, but I do have some observations that I would like to make.

I agree almost completely with Dr. Brzezinski's analysis. We do differ in some respects on prescription. I think one of the fundamental points to underscore is that the national security system exists to assist the President in the discharge of his responsibilities, as Dr. Brzezinski pointed out.

Now, there are a couple of things that flow from that.

First, that the system by and large should, therefore, reflect the operating predilection of the particular President.

Indeed, if a structure is imposed that does not suit his own operating style, he will either formally or informally modify it so that he can use his advisors in the manner in which he wishes to get their advice.

It may then also follow that there is no single ideal structure for our national security machinery and it may be that emphasis on structure is not so important as emphasis on process and indeed emphasis on personality which with a small number at the top of our national security decisionmaking process are very, very important.

But there are functions which must be performed in some manner if the system is to work at all and if it is to serve the President.

First of all, the President has to have sources of information quickly available to him and available in an objective, nonbiased fashion. He needs advice, unalloyed by major institutional responsibility or major bureaucracies with their own points of view.

He needs somebody of substance at his side who has the President's own perspective on national security affairs. Somehow the national security concerns when they come to the White House must be integrated with the other concerns of the President, political concerns, media concerns, congressional concerns.

Problems do not come to the President as problems in defense, in foreign policy, in intelligence; they come as Presidential problems and he has to look at them in that way.

Second, besides the kind of advisory role, there needs to be the development of national strategy and policy and on that score I certainly agree with Dr. Brzezinski that in the past we have been sadly remiss in our concentration on those very elemental issues of national policy.

Options and viewpoints must be presented to the President fully with every reasonable option explored in terms of the probable conse-

quences of its adoption or of its rejection, and the points of view of all need to be explicated very carefully.

Last, there is a function which is all too often overlooked, but which is in a sense the essence of the President's management of foreign affairs and that is that there must be some oversight over implementation of the President's decisions because it is in their implementation—it is in the cables that go out to the field, that the President's decisions in fact are interpreted either the way he wanted or the way others in the bureaucracy wanted.

There are two ways these functions that have to be performed can be performed. I would say generally they are a cabinet kind of organization or a centralized kind of organization.

The advantage of cabinet organization is that in a sense if we look over our 200 years, it is the traditional way we have organized the executive branch. It does in part avoid an additional bureaucracy that has to be added with the centralization.

But there are serious problems. First of all, while the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense are the principal advisers to the President in their particular areas, they do have divided responsibility in a sense.

They are at the same time the head of great departments, great bureaucracies, with their own points of view, with their own egos, with their own way of doing things.

Thus, if you try to operate with a cabinet government, you either have great difficulty in coordinating among these departments or you must appoint one or the other of the agency or department heads as the coordinator.

As Dr. Brzezinski pointed out, that is an extremely difficult thing to do, to ask one cabinet officer to take orders from another. The perspectives will not always be presented with the President's viewpoints in mind.

Centralization, I think, is a far preferable way to go. I do believe the national security adviser needs to be a person of substance, not simply an administrator oiling the machinery of coordination.

I would not, however, make the national security staff a replica of either the Department of Defense staff or the State Department staff. I think it has to have expertise in each of the functional and regional areas, but only enough to insure that the work that comes from the Department is properly and most effectively done.

I do not believe that the national security adviser should be elevated in formal stature, nor be subject to confirmation by the Senate.

The authority of the national security adviser rests in his relationship with the President. If he has the right relationship with the President, he has all the authority he needs.

To have him formally overshadowing the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, in my judgment, would be a mistake.

Much of the conflict that has been more widely publicized than the facts would justify has been not over the power of the national security adviser in advising the President; it has been in his public role as explicator of national policy, and in that sense I think by and large national policy should be explained either by the President or by the heads of the departments concerned with their particular areas.

As to the membership of the National Security Council, I think that statutory changes in it would not be productive. The President is going to rely on those people in whom he has confidence.

In the Eisenhower years the NSC system was very broad, there were a number of people involved, and so on.

President Kennedy did not like that system. He set up what he called the Executive Committee of the National Security Council which actually had more members than the statutory members of the NSC. They were people on whom he relied.

I think the present system where the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is an adviser to the NSC is perfectly adequate. He does and should attend most of the meetings and he will respond in whatever manner the President wishes to use him.

There is an incipient awkwardness between the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. It is not an insuperable problem, but there is the hierarchical problem between the two and, apart from that, the ability of the Chairman to speak out frankly and openly whether or not his views do or do not coincide with those of the Secretary of Defense.

Just a word about the Joint Chiefs themselves. Warfare has evolved dramatically within our lifetime, much more dramatically than the organization of our military departments to deal with it.

We still, by and large, raise, train, and equip our forces by service, and yet it is difficult to think of a major military action that this country is likely to undertake in the world where we will in fact be fighting by service rather than by integrated units.

If we do not change to start training the way we will be fighting, we will be in increasingly serious shape.

The last point is that to me it is a great anomaly in a profession which prides itself on command responsibility, on personal leadership, to be run at the top by a committee. I think that as long as that happens, we will not get the kind of unalloyed advice that the President needs from the wealth of intelligence and wisdom that reside in the military services.

At the heart of our national security machinery is the President. If it works, the President should get the credit. If it doesn't, there is nowhere else to put the blame.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, General Scowcroft.

Dr. Brzezinski, I think every administration has been criticized, perhaps in a partisan way, for not having a national strategy.

I have been guilty of criticizing Democratic administrations for that and my Democratic colleagues criticize this administration for it. But, in fact, isn't there a fundamental thread of continuity of national strategic policy that runs through all administrations regardless of their political dispositions which is driven by constant and geopolitical situations, perceptions of national interests, and perception of threats?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I think that is basically right, Senator. I think there are fundamental continuities which guide American foreign policy and even when there is a change from one party to another in terms of administration, after a while the new team comes to emphasize more the elements of continuity and less claims of innovation.

It certainly happened in the administration with which I was associated. I think it also has happened under the current one.

But that does not, in my judgment, answer adequately the question of whether enhanced and more integrated planning on broad national security policy is needed.

Currently it is nowhere being undertaken. In the NSC there is today no mechanism for coordinated planning of our longer term geopolitical and strategic policies, and to the extent that any is undertaken, it is currently undertaken within departments, within their own specified and even parochial viewpoints.

There is a policy planning staff in the State Department with its natural bias toward traditional diplomacy.

There is some tiny work being done in the Defense Department, ISA, in the Secretary's Office with its natural preoccupation with defense matters.

We don't have our theoreticians and academicians, but actually experienced senior policy officials which would bring them together and force them to think through the longer term implications either of new technologies or regional developments or new challenges from the Soviets, or whatever.

It is this gap which I think could usefully be filled by the creation of an organization such as the one I advocate in my testimony.

Chairman TOWER. You suggest the establishment of a strategic planning board, an interagency board, made up of senior officials of various agencies. Would that not in some way duplicate the function of the National Security Council? Why shouldn't the National Security Council be the regional planning board?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. It would not duplicate it. It would do what should be done in the NSC. NSC is formed for two things which are sometimes confused. I know you are not confused, but the public often is.

One is just a meeting of senior officials when they come together and sit around the table and talk about policy issues for an hour or two, once, twice, or three times a week.

But NSC is also a staff of officials who coordinate, integrate, clear cables, try to supervise implementation.

It is on the second level that I think we need a more continuous effort to systematically integrate and plan our policies with a larger, broader strategic perspective in mind, in effect, doing what was being done by such a body under NSC under Eisenhower, a body which President Kennedy abolished, I think mistakenly, and which, therefore, has left a gap.

I would have in mind some process by which somebody on the level of an Assistant Secretary, even Under Secretary of State, let us say, a Larry Eagleburger type, and someone like Ikle and someone like Gates at CIA, and counterparts in other agencies literally who are put together in a context in which they work together on some of the issues from the standpoint of devising longer term sets of goals and means of getting these goals, integrating regional policy with its impact on other regions, and so forth.

Most of our decisionmaking right now is essentially responsive to crises, though within this element of continuity which you mentioned.

Chairman TOWER. Do you have any comment, General Scowcroft?

General SCOWCROFT. One of my greatest regrets as national security adviser was the lack of attention which I was able to give to longer-range thoughts about where we were going, how we ought to get there, and how we could better integrate military research and development with our foreign policy projections.

I don't disagree with Dr. Brzezinski in his recommendations. In fact, we did have a committee of the NSC structure which was supposed to perform those functions.

One of the practical problems is that if you keep the NSC staff as small and lean as it should be and have them working 14 or 16 hours a day, then you tend to draw people away to firefighting rather than to do the kinds of things which ideally the NSC should spend most of its time on, and that is on the broader issues and not on detailed policy-making.

I think it can be done within the subcommittee framework of the NSC system as it exists, but I certainly think we need more attention on it. I would say not quite in the grand style that the Eisenhower administration did.

One of the Kennedy criticisms of it was that broad policy statements like NSC 1968 tended to be so broad that they were not guidance to action, but the other extreme was Kennedy who wanted policy to be taken from the speeches of senior officials.

I think we need, whether or not it comes out in documentation that says this is our national policy, more thoughtful attention to longer-range projections of evolution of the world system and the role that the United States can be expected to play and what kinds of military systems we will need in order to play that role. We do not give sufficient attention to it at present.

Chairman TOWER. Let me try to more narrowly focus on the Department of Defense which, of course, is our primary concern. I would like both of you to respond to this question.

What is the appropriate role of the Defense Department in the formulation of national security policy and how does that role relate to the roles of the National Security Council, the State Department, and other policymakers involved in the process? Where does it fit in, so to speak?

General SCOWCROFT. I think the Defense Department has an integral role in national security policy because any U.S. policy which cannot be supported, if necessary, with our forces will be an ineffective policy.

If we generate forces in a kind of straight-line projection of where they were before or doing everything a little bit better, a little bit more complicated, and so on, rather than to try to focus on the world as we expect it to be in 10 or 15 years and analyze the forces that we are likely to have in order to defend and project U.S. interests in that kind of world, we will be in jeopardy.

Before we have always been able, because of our immense power, to throw resources at problems. We have never had to plan very carefully before.

We have run out of excess resources and we are going to have to now substitute thought for money, which we have relied on before.

I think that Defense with its background of uses of power and the way that they can and cannot usefully be employed in the pursuit

of our national interests and national objectives is an essential aspect of deciding on what our policy can do because we should not announce and pursue policies which in the end cannot be supported by force, if necessary.

Chairman TOWER. Dr. Brzezinski?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Broadly speaking, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the function of the Department of Defense and of the military services is to fight a war, to try to deter a war, to compel other nations to accommodate themselves to us, if necessary, and to provide power support for our diplomacy.

In fighting a war, I think the Department of Defense has a pre-eminent role in determining what tactics and strategy and weapon systems are needed, what are the requirements of fighting a war successfully.

In attempting to deter a war, it seems to me we already enter an area in which the Department of Defense, while taking the lead, has to do so in the context of greater participation of civilian strategists, of the CIA, which assesses what it takes to deter an opponent and gives us an insight into what kind of posture is most effective in deterring our opponents and influencing their conduct.

In compelling other nations to accommodate themselves, if necessary, to our requirements, obviously the Department of Defense has to share responsibility, not only with the CIA, but the State Department, perhaps even with other agencies which can be used to influence the will and the attitudes of other nations and hence more coordination and integration is needed here.

Finally, in supporting our diplomacy, clearly defense is only one component of a larger spectrum of resources available to the President in the pursuit of our national interest.

Now, quite clearly if you take a four-step list as a crude definition of the NSC, the coordinating process is more important in the fourth. It is somewhat important in the third. It is less important in the second and least important in the first.

Hence, the NSC as a mechanism of providing a framework within which the various functions are performed is clearly necessary.

There has to be some distinction in the degree to which the President relies on the Secretary of Defense for views. I would say that that depends on which of these four functions is the issue involved with the first being the most important in the event of a war.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you. My time has expired.

Senator Goldwater?

Senator GOLDWATER. General Scowcroft, you made a remark that interested me greatly because it was the thesis of my paper at the War College, the unification of our Armed Forces, to the end that we felt it would be more Napoleonic in our approach or more in conformity with some of his ideas.

I am inclined to agree with you that it is very difficult to envision a war in the future where we have an Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps on the ground and Navy all operating essentially separately.

During World War II we had theater commanders that were confronted with the problem of inter-service rivalry and inter-service bickering. Have you written anything on this subject? Have you given

enough thought to it to give us a brief outline on paper detailing how we might approach even thinking about it?

General SCOWCROFT. I have not written on it, Senator.

I would approach it in an evolutionary stage. The Department of Defense has evolved toward centralization from its inception in 1947 in progressive stages until about 1958, and then it pretty much stopped and has not really changed since then.

Now, what the ultimate would have been, had it continued to evolve, is hard to say, but it is sort of halfway in between the kind of independence of different services under which we went into World War II and the kind of highly centralized, almost single department system.

I would move very modestly now and principally in the direction of giving greater authority to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, first of all, to give him authority in the range that the Chiefs now have authority, to give the Chairman decision authority and to make that of the other Chiefs advisory to that of the Chairman.

I think that single step would do a great deal to unify our military thinking and to change its direction because the only one of the Chiefs whose primary responsibility is the unified commanders and fighting the forces is the Chairman.

The other Chiefs have to be concerned with their own services, with their own service budget, and with their own individual policy because if they don't, nobody else will protect them.

So, I think the Chairman needs to have that kind of authority. He needs to have a greater say over the budget allocation and over development issues.

It doesn't make any sense, for example, for the Air Force to go ahead and build its transports the way it wants to and then not be able to haul Army equipment in them.

Neither does it make any sense for the Army to go ahead and build the tanks it wants if the Air Force and Navy can't get them anywhere.

Those are the kinds of things which, you know better than I, are replicated over and over again.

I think the focal point for the rectification of these problems ought to be at the beginning, the Chairman and the joint staff. I would expand it gradually from there.

Senator GOLDWATER. Thank you.

I can tell you that the difficulty does not stop or start on the battlefield. It comes up here every time we have a hearing. While the act of 1947 was intended to unify the forces and, as you suggest, it did provide that for a number of years, we are back in the old politics of who gets what regardless of why we do or do not want it.

That leads me to comment on both of your statements relative to a national strategy. I have felt in all my years here and the years connected with the military, that the absence of some central strategy around which we could base decisions or allow the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to base decisions on inventory and tactical and strategic use would be extremely valuable. I think both of you would do a great service to this committee if you could very briefly outline on paper what you think that strategy should look like. Could you both do that? I have also asked other people to do it.

General SCOWCROFT. Certainly, Senator.

Senator GOLDWATER. Going back to the days of Eisenhower.

Now, Dr. Brzezinski, I was very much interested in your opening remarks. In the first paragraph, in commenting on the national security decisionmaking system, you state it should be "the creature of the personal style of the President himself." I agree.

Then you say, "It would be a mistake so to formalize the process as to inhibit the President's freedom to operate in a manner that is most congenial to him." I am in complete agreement there, but we have been running into some problems on that, I think, in the past discussions of the National Security Council or the Joint Chiefs. In my opinion, the President's probably sole major responsibility is the formulation and conduct of foreign policy.

That is why we are discussing with you the power that we should find in the advisory committees that the President can use. However, while our Constitution has made him Commander in Chief and has given him such prerogatives, in that he is the only person in this country who can order any of us to war, the Congress is getting into the act.

This is not new. We nearly lost the Revolutionary War because we had a Congress that wanted to get out and make tactical decisions and promotions.

We passed the War Powers Act which I think did tremendous damage to the President's ability to use people like you in the conduct of advice because they wanted to take it unto themselves, take the power of Congress to conduct war. To me that is unconstitutional and disastrous.

Now we are confronted with a little problem of whether we will allow covert action on the part of the intelligence family or whether it should always be overt. Again, I think this is unconstitutional because when you do things overtly, you have to go to war. I would like to have you comment on that, Doctor, and how you feel the influence of the Congress has been lately and might be in the future on the prerogatives of the President in this field and the National Security Council.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. You have raised, Senator, perhaps a most difficult question and I am very conscious of the fact that in my answer I cannot be very precise.

It is very difficult to draw the proper limits of constitutional responsibility between the executive and legislative branches.

As a general proposition, let me begin by responding that I do have the feeling in light of my own experience that in recent years the Congress has moved to an excessive degree into the actual management of what I would call national security policy.

I was struck on more than one occasion when we went through the proper procedures of notifying Congress regarding some covert activity which the President deemed to be in the national interest and the requirement was to notify Congress.

The response of the congressional committees dealing with these matters was to comment on the substance of the covert activities, on their desirability, on the fashion in which they were being undertaken all matters which, in my judgment, were not the proper responsibilities of the legislative branch of government.

My overall view is that Congress is supposed to mandate, to approve, to sanction, but not to be involved in the actual execution and management of national security policy, be they in intelligence or in war fighting.

Having said that, I realize that we are now in an age in our democracy in which it is much more difficult to confine traditional foreign affairs to the executive branch. We have more educated citizenry. We have a much better informed Congress. Senators and Congressmen have larger staffs.

Nevertheless, I think we need to strike a more balanced relationship than the one which has emerged, as a consequence perhaps of the excesses of the Vietnamese war, of Watergate and the reactions that all of that produces.

I think there has to be a greater grant of confidence to the President, to the executive branch, for the day-to-day conduct of sensitive activities.

On covert activities, I think it is a legitimate, proper and needed element in our national security policy. But covert activity, I think, does differ from covert wars and it is an important distinction.

I think the executive branch should have genuine autonomy in the conduct of covert activity, by that I mean action designed to influence political behavior of other nations, but that is not the same thing as covert war.

I think it would be a mistake to permit the executive branch to raise private armies and to wage covert wars because that, I think, does infringe on the constitutional responsibilities of Congress.

Are we doing an active or are we waging a covert war in Nicaragua? I think we are coming close to an active war. That is a matter of specific judgment regarding a specific situation.

In that particular case I think that overt support for such activity may be a preferable way of proceeding. I personally approve of the effort to coerce Nicaragua into more responsible behavior, but if the coercion is going to be accomplished by a covert war, then I think Congress can legitimately ask that this be done through a formal mandate in a somewhat more overt fashion.

Senator GOLDWATER. I know my time is up. General Scowcroft do you want to comment?

General SCOWCROFT. Yes.

In general, I think the pendulum has swung fairly sharply away from Presidential authority and it has swung back and forth many times over our history. Our Constitution is not designed for efficiency, it is designed for protection of the rights of individuals.

I do think we have a serious problem between the executive and legislature now and I think that it has taken the form of micro-management in a way that is improper.

I do think that the War Powers Act not only is an infringement on the Presidential prerogatives as Commander in Chief, but I think it also undercuts the effectiveness of any policy we may want to employ with the use of military forces, thus, it is bad national policy.

But I think we do need to get a vehicle for deliberation on the broader kind of issues we are talking about, strategy and policy.

You, Senator, and the chairman have a vast background of knowledge about national security policy, about where we ought to be going

that is invaluable in the service of this country and there ought to be some mechanism by which the senior members of the executive and people such as yourself can sit down and talk about our national goals and where we ought to be going and how we ought to be getting there.

It is there, it seems to me, that the Congress can and should play as the voice of the people its proper role.

On covert action, I would not define it quite so finely as Dr. Brzezinski.

If you leave out covert intelligence, which is an entirely different thing, we are talking about covert operations, it seems to me that the United States does have to have some kind of vehicle in between diplomatic action and use of U.S. military forces to influence behavior and to accomplish our goals.

I think covert operations are by their nature very difficult in this day and age in this country to operate in the manner in which they need to be operated if they are to be effective.

I think, therefore, one has to consider very carefully before one undertakes one if the essence of the operation is to be covert.

I, myself, think that if we can influence military action in a way which for a variety of reasons, whether it is in Angola, whether it is in Vietnam, whether it is Central America, where the overt hand of the United States would prove to be counterproductive to our goals, then I see nothing inherently wrong with it.

Senator GOLDWATER. Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. Let me ask both of you this question.

Have we in the past, do we now, adequately tailor our defense capability to what is required to support our foreign policy objective? That is to say, is there enough input into the process of the formulation of our military forces by the foreign policy arm of the Government?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I would say as a broad proposition probably no, there is not sufficient input.

Force posture decisions, weapons development decisions tend to be driven very much by their own logic within the Defense Department and are not, in my judgment, actively integrated with our foreign policy requirements.

The only major exception I can think of in recent years is the development of the RDF. That was clearly guided by geopolitical strategic considerations that were shaped in the NSC and which were then integrated in our defense plans.

But in terms of such issues as the size of the Navy or some of our strategic decisions in recent years in terms of the development of new systems, I do not see too much of an effort to integrate them into the broader foreign policy design of the United States.

Here again, the creation of some mechanism for the more deliberate integration of geopolitical strategy, international economics, it would help over time to develop criteria which might be useful when applied to specific decisions within individual departments including in this instance the Defense Department.

Chairman TOWER. General Scowcroft?

General SCOWCROFT. Mr. Chairman, I think the essence of the problem is how much military insurance do we buy.

We do not have military forces and probably never have had, except perhaps at the end of World War II, to protect every interest

everywhere around the world where something happens, all of them simultaneously.

We do have to make choices and we have to devise different ways of doing that. A 2½-force strategy, 1½-force strategy, those were not really related to a foreign policy assessment of what was most likely to happen.

Rather, they were force-limiting exercises designed to cap the size of the Defense Department. It will always be an uncertain process.

How much insurance do we need? How much do we have to count on multiple contingencies such as happened, for example, earlier this year? And how much can we double count?

The RDF is a good example. It certainly arose from political imperatives, but we met the need mostly by double bookkeeping, not by military changes.

I do think that we need a closer integration of our foreign policy goals and of the likely risk to our national interest and both the size and characteristics of the military forces that we procure. I think we are not closely synchronized now.

Chairman TOWER. Dr. Brzezinski, the Iranian hostage rescue mission has been criticized by some for not having maintained unit integrity or having used then-existing joint command structure.

In your view, are there any lessons we can learn from this experience that are pertinent to our committee's overall study of the Defense Department organization?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. One basic lesson is that interservice interests dictated very much the character of the force that was used. Every service wished to be represented in this enterprise and that did not enhance cohesion and integration.

I think that is a very fundamental lesson very much in keeping with your concerns, Senator.

Chairman TOWER. Let us take the example of the recent action in Grenada. What do you see as the appropriate method for making such a decision in terms of the role of different players in the national security policy process?

Let me ask General Scowcroft to respond and then have Dr. Brzezinski comment.

General SCOWCROFT. I am not sure I understand the question.

Chairman TOWER. Using Grenada as an example, what do you see as the appropriate method for making such a decision in terms of the role of the different players in the national security policy process?

General SCOWCROFT. I think that analysis, first of all, of the situation, the developing situation and probable alternatives is a proper function of the national security adviser and the NSC system in coordination with the relevant departments.

I think that it should be developed as an option together with other options, very quickly in this particular case, and a very careful analysis of the consequences, the options that worked and those that did not work, and compare them very carefully with the other options.

Then I think that the National Security Council should discuss and debate these things and provide to the President their individual or collective judgment, depending on how the issue falls.

There are a number of intangibles in any decision such as the use of force in the Grenada incident and I think in the end it is a matter of

judgment, and to the extent that that judgment can be informed by as careful an appraisal of the costs as well as the rewards beforehand, the President is likely to make an informed judgment.

My own analysis of the Grenadan operation is that it was very well planned and very well executed.

Chairman TOWER. Dr. Brzezinski?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Under ideal conditions, Senator, an operation of this sort should be preceded by an assessment by the CIA of the likely consequences of not reacting to the Grenada situation, what is likely to evolve in the region, what is likely to happen in the Caribbean, what is likely to happen in the Soviet-Cuban role as well as assessment by the CIA of the likely consequences of a U.S. action in regard to the mission.

Second, it should be echoed by assessment by the Department of State of what is going to be the impact of either acting or not acting in our relations with Latin America, our allies, the Soviets.

Finally, the Department of Defense should provide the President with an assessment of the likely scale of the operation, its physical cost, degree of violence, and so forth. But that is under ideal circumstances.

My impression is that in this particular case events moved so rapidly that the process had to be telescoped and in all probability was not as refined nor as elaborate as one might wish.

But that brings me to a more basic point.

There will be many times in the future, as there have been in the past, when fundamentally important decisions have to be made by the top decisionmakers and particularly by the President, himself, on the basis of gut and instinct.

These are terribly important qualities of leadership, often underestimated and certainly very difficult to define.

My own experience in working for a President very closely and knowing several Presidents is that that may be a more important test of what it takes to be a President than almost anything else, including intelligence and ability to absorb a lot of information.

In the final analysis the test of great leadership is this mysterious quality of gut and instinct which enables an individual to assess the situation correctly even on the basis of extremely limited and tenuous information and then to act.

In this particular case, as I have said before publicly, I happen to support and applaud the action taken.

Chairman TOWER. I would like each of you to describe the nature of your interaction with the Secretary of Defense while you were serving as national security adviser.

What decisions did you consult with the Secretary of Defense about? Were you involved in resource allocation decisions or decisions about which potential international conflict scenarios should receive priority in our military planning?

Could each of you comment on that?

General SCOWCROFT. That is a very difficult question to answer, Mr. Chairman.

I think there was never a day that I was not at least on the phone with the Secretary of Defense at least once and the range of conversa-

tions dealt very broadly with the whole range of national security policy.

I think there is a natural sense of protectiveness on the part of the Secretary of Defense for what he considers his own prerogatives and I think by and large those ought to be respected unless they cut across other broader concerns that the President may have.

In the narrow problem of day-to-day allocation of resources, that was rarely an issue.

On some particular kinds of problems, however, it became a very important issue. For example, on some of our intelligence assets funded by and large and either built or operated by the Defense Department, there were very lengthy discussions on resource allocation there on the relationship between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense.

I don't know if that is responsive to your question.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I have found generally the Defense Department is more difficult to deal with than the State Department, contrary to the public impression.

I think in part this is due to the fact that Foreign Service officers when they become members of the NSC are very responsive to Presidential requirements and perform effectively the function of supervising and even, if necessary, directing the work of the different branches of the State Department in keeping with the direction set by the national security adviser for the President.

At least that was my experience. The NSC staff, strong in the Defense Department, particularly from the services, tends to remain career-wise very much committed to the Defense Department, I had a feeling, more so than was the case of the Foreign Service officers.

Hence, there is less ability to inject one's self effectively from the outside into the internal workings of the Defense Department and particularly to influence the decisions when it comes to budgetary allocations.

Beyond that there is the very special problem of the Secretary of Defense needing to assert himself vis-a-vis the services and, because of that, being very concerned over any direct lines from the NSC to the services.

The Secretary of Defense that I dealt with, with whom I had a very congenial relationship and with whom I was very much in agreement on policy issues, was much more jealous, protective of NSC injection into the workings of his shop and opposed to any direct meetings with the service chiefs—he wanted everything to go through the OSD—unlike the Secretary of State.

The President on more than one occasion egged me on to inject NSC much more into the workings of the Defense Department, to screen and supervise more closely its budgetary proposals and internal budgetary processes.

It was very difficult to implement the President's desires effectively because of this ability of the Defense Department to resist the very special interest of the NSC in keeping lines of communication passing through the OSD, itself.

Chairman TOWER. We have had quite a bit of discussion in our hearings on the matter of the input of CINC's and the unified command

into the process of resource allocation. Did either of you, during your tenure, rely on the CINC's to coordinate with the CINC's on any recommendations you might have made to DOD regarding resource allocation?

General Scowcroft?

General SCOWCROFT. Not directly. I did have fairly close contact with SACEUR and with CINCPAC. It did relate to resource allocation in a broad sense and that is what kind of forces would be provided. It was all done very informally, however.

I must agree with my colleague that I think probably by the very nature of the Department and its difference from the State Department, it is more difficult to deal with the Department of Defense and especially at the lateral level between NSC staff people and staff people in the Department.

The Secretaries of Defense by and large want to control everything through their own office and that also applies to contacts with the various CINC's.

So that my contacts, while they were fairly extensive, were always informal.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I would echo what General Scowcroft said.

In my own meetings with CINC's we were limited to some extent in some meetings with SAC, and SAC particularly, because my office was very much concerned with the effort to modernize and revise our strategic doctrine.

We finally developed PD-59 as a consequence of that concern and that required somewhat more dealings with SAC, but other than that, I had no dealings with any CINC's.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much. I have a few questions, Mr. Chairman, and I will submit them for the record.

I am glad to see you gentlemen. We are pleased to have you here today. We thank you for your presence and your testimony.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I want to join in expressing appreciation of this committee and indeed the whole Senate to these gentlemen for their participation. I apologize for my tardiness. I hope you recognize it is one of the things in the Senate. The absence of the Members in no way indicates lack of interest.

I will study the record.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Quayle?

Senator QUAYLE. I, too, want to join in thanking both of you for coming here and for the contribution you have made. I just briefly arrived.

Dr. Brzezinski, I have read through your statement. It seems to me from a very cursory reading, you strongly support the beefing-up of the national security spot to be confirmed by the Senate. It appears you want to see an enhancement of that role, the responsibilities and some of the authority that perhaps is not there directly.

Is that a correct reading of what you are trying to say?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. In essence, yes.

Senator QUAYLE. If that is the case, then, on the contrary, won't you be mitigating the authority and the responsibility—and I realize that there is change from President to President—by doing that? Don't you

lessen some of the authority and responsibility of the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense?

I am curious about the inner play that we would have in this thing in the formulation of policy. You are going in a specific direction. I don't know whether the general agrees with this or not.

Maybe you have gotten into this, Mr. Chairman. If you have, I will read it in the record.

Would you expand a little bit on the interplay between these three very important figures, and it seems there is an inherent conflict that evolves?

Whatever administration there is, it is always there. I am interested in augmenting the power and stature and responsibility of the NSC adviser and how this will not lessen the authority of the Secretary of State.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. The problem in its essence is that for reasons that cannot be avoided or evaded, the national security adviser has a lot of power, but some of that power is not seen as legitimate and indeed some of that power is often seen as a usurpation of the Secretary of State's particular prerogatives.

One of the major purposes of my recommendation is to correct that by making the responsibilities of the National Security Adviser genuine and legitimate.

It is also my purpose to make it possible for him to maintain a formal and not a covert dialog with appropriate legislative committees on issues of national security which is a matter broader than traditional diplomacy or defense or intelligence.

It got to be said that the national security adviser has all the authority he needed if he has a close relationship with the President, but that is not exactly right.

He may have all the power he needs, but he does not have all the legitimate authority. Most of the things, I would say the major things, that Kissinger did or I did were mandated by our Presidents.

Yet they got us into trouble with the Secretary of State, with the media, with the prevailing wisdom, because the assumption of these tasks mandated by the President was somehow viewed as illegitimate matter.

Yet it is unavoidable in a day in which foreign and domestic policy interact with national issues and in which matters of national survival have to be quickly decided by the President that the Presidential perspective has to be maintained.

In effect, what I am advocating is that we face up to the problem as intelligently and creatively, even occasionally controversially, as we did in the past when we first integrated the three services into a common department.

There was enormous opposition to the creation of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Yet no one today would say let us go back to three separate Secretaries who would each present a point of view to the President.

The Secretaries of the Army, Air Force, and Navy do not sit in NSC; for a while they did initially, even after the Office of the Secretary of Defense was created.

In economic policy, the Director of the OMB is now approved by the Senate. This does not undercut the Secretary of the Treasury or of Commerce or the other economic officers, but it does provide for a

legitimate integration in which the Director of the OMB does for the President the necessary tasks of coordinating the pertinent departments and providing the same kinds of larger perspective.

I think we need to rationalize the structure we have and to make it clear that, today, national security cannot be integrated by the Secretary of Defense because no Secretary of State would have that; that national security cannot be integrated by State because no Secretary of Defense would accept that. It needs to be integrated legitimately, and in so doing, to impose on the process a Presidential perspective.

I do not think Mr. Stockman makes Mr. Reagan an insignificant player.

I don't think senatorial confirmation of the national security adviser would denigrate the Secretary of State, but would make the player in the White House much more legitimate in what he needs to do and a very important byproduct of this would be a more open, direct consultative process with Congress which doesn't exist.

When I wanted to meet with leading Senators, I would do it practically covertly because it was viewed as somehow or other infringing on the rights and prerogatives of the Secretary of State.

I think it is an anomaly, counterproductive. By doing what I advocate, we could actively engage in a more systematic process of planning our national security strategy, which means integrating components of defense, intelligence, international economics, and political warfare.

It cannot be done from the vantage point of the traditional departments.

Senator QUAYLE. You used the analogy of Dave Stockman, the OMB Director.

I am sure we know the OMB Director under the Carter administration spent an ungodly amount of time up here dealing with numbers and requests that I am not so sure you would like to get that far involved in the legislative process.

The OMB, with the amount of testimony that they would have to give on the Hill, really takes away as being a close, intimate adviser to the President that the national security adviser from my perspective should be.

I do not quarrel with your description of a problem and its legitimate aspect. I think the point raised is a legitimate concern, although I would think the understanding and working between the four principals—maybe including CIA in this, five—would develop a working relationship.

That bothers me, your statement that you felt you had to do it almost covertly.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. The amount of time the Director of the Budget spends on the Hill is not due to the fact he is confirmed by the Senate.

It is due to the fact that he works with the budget which happens to be a very major congressional responsibility.

I think the amount of time the NSC adviser would have to spend up on the Hill, which would be considerable, would not be, however, as time-consuming as the OMB Director. It would be more comparable to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, CIA Director.

It would be time-consuming. It would probably be very painful, but I think it would help on the whole to enhance the process.

Senator QUAYLE. If you get that coordination with Congress, I think you may be surprised at the demand—not from this chairman because he has a different viewpoint than a lot of people—I think you would be surprised at the demands on your time between this committee, Foreign Relations Committee, both House and Senate, and then you get into the Appropriations Committee.

They will say we want to get the No. 1 person here, not the Secretary of State or Defense. We want the national security adviser, whether the C-5A ought to have this wing or what wing.

I do think you stress a very good point.

General, could you comment on some of the outlines that he has put down?

General SCOWCROFT. Yes, I am aware of it.

Senator QUAYLE. Do you agree or disagree?

General SCOWCROFT. I disagree very sharply with his recommendations. I think that the role of the national security adviser, is totally dependent on the President which, in my judgment, is as it should be.

He has the authority that the President wants him to have. If it appears like a usurpation, then maybe that is the way the President wants it to appear as well.

The other participants in the process, if they know the national security adviser speaks for the President when he says he speaks for the President, will recognize he has all the authority he needs.

To elevate this person to cast doubt on his role relative to that of the Secretaries of State and Defense and thus, in a sense, to downgrade their positions, I think would produce profound consequences and I can even see a situation where, if this person were created, the President having such a formal person would then, in a few years, go out and get himself a new national security adviser to do the kind of things the President feels needs to be done by a man who is an intimate of his in this whole process.

It is a problem, there is no question about it. It is a problem, in my judgment, which is not susceptible of organizational solution. It is a problem of personality.

I would suggest that this solution while it would address what is the real problem, that the solution would make the situation worse rather than better.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. May I comment?

Senator QUAYLE. Yes, sir.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I think it is an important issue and needs to be vented.

Obviously, if everybody was in agreement with the proposed reform, even if reform was redundant or inconsequential, so disagreement, I think, in a sense reflects the importance of the issue.

Let me say, throughout the world in all major powers the tendency is for the coordination of national security policy to be located in the Chief Executive's Office.

In France now, in spite of the traditional preeminence of the Quay D'Orsay, it is now the Elysee, the seat of the Presidential power, that is becoming more important.

The same process is being pursued at 10 Downing Street with Mrs. Thatcher, in fact, the equivalent of NSC, and it is happening also in the German Chancellor's Office.

So, we are dealing with the trend line. It will not be reversed. Power will be concentrated in the White House. Unless it is regularized, legitimized, we will have the hassle on which the media feeds and on which more importantly the bureaucracy thrives.

I think it is destructive. We have all seen it happen in the last several years. I don't think we can revert again to the notion somehow or other the Secretary of State is preeminent in foreign policy because foreign policy is now too large and broader.

We have to find some mechanism for making it proper, legitimate and regular, including the intercourse with Congress.

General SCOWCROFT. I think a change like this might change the character of the debate, but it will go on fiercely.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. It will reduce the conflict, but it will never terminate it. A lot of the conflict is due to the fact that it is unclear where the proper boundaries are.

Chairman TOWER. We will have a heck of a jurisdictional fight down here determining which committee will hear the confirmation.

Senator QUAYLE. My time is up, but I have one other area.

Chairman TOWER. Let me ask a couple of questions and then I will come back to you, Senator.

There are a number of issues that concern the Defense Department for which the Department has limited responsibility. I think particularly of security assistance, foreign military sales, and technology transfers. In your experience, has the Department expressed a decision on this subject?

It has been recently suggested that we should integrate the security assistance budget with our defense budget and present them as an integrated whole.

I would appreciate any comment you might have on that.

General SCOWCROFT. I think we do need to look at our security assistance, indeed our economic assistance, in a way that we have not tended to do.

When I was national security adviser, we thought very seriously about changing the position of the security assistant—I can't remember what his title is—in the State Department and making that function primarily an NSC function.

I think it is not managed properly now. Security assistance is not looked at as an alternative resource either for the use of U.S. power or economic assistance, or what have you.

I think it would be useful, if only in an informal way, so that we can see in fact what we are doing as a whole to have what we might call a national security budget in which we look at the resources, and these are all just different levers or vehicles that we have available to support the national interest, which one is most appropriate, and to be able to deal with them centrally, not in the fragmented way they are now.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I would agree with that. I don't have really much to add.

Chairman TOWER. What I was thinking about, of course, is the fact that security assistance kind of serves as a force multiplier for the United States. It stands in place of the necessity of our having to respond in certain parts of the world. It occurs to me that security assistance policy is not adequately integrated with defense policy.

General SCOWCROFT. That is absolutely correct, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency authorization conference report provides that the Director of ACDA be made a member of the National Security Council.

Do either of you believe that the Director of ACDA should be made a member of the National Security Council?

General SCOWCROFT. No, I do not, Mr. Chairman.

I think in every case where issues of relevance to the Director of ACDA are concerned, he would, as a matter of course, be invited to attend the meetings and participate as a full member.

There are a number of issues of national security where the Director of ACDA is not involved. As a matter of fact, I think on principle I do not believe it worthwhile to change the membership of the NSC in any way.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I would agree with that. I would oppose it, too.

Some of the considerations that I raised, asserting that it is really immaterial whether the Chairman of the JCS becomes a statutory member, apply to ACDA, but even more so because ACDA reflects a very specific aspect of foreign policy.

I think it would be a bad precedent to elevate the bureaucratic chief of that particular focus into a member of NSC. It would establish precedent for others as well, USIA, for example.

Chairman TOWER. Of course, my view is that the ultimate objective of arms control policy should be to enhance the security of the United States. I feel that sometimes under the policy you have taken, national security considerations would be subordinated to the arms control objectives.

I wonder if participation by ACDA in the National Security Council would clarify that situation or not?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Actually as a matter of practice, when SALT was discussed, the head of ACDA participated in the meetings on the President's invitation. So, I don't think his voice was not heard. That is not the problem.

I think making him a formal statutory member would beg the question of why agency heads who have something to contribute to the national security process are not members of the National Security Council in a formal sense.

For example, the USIA. I think it would simply open the Pandora's box to a lot of other similar demands.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Quayle?

Senator QUAYLE. Another issue that we have heard throughout the hearing is the problem where there is a lack of coordination in the Joint Chiefs, each service wants its own thing, at times ruling in duplication, obviously inefficiency.

I wonder from your perspective are there any specific structural organizational changes that the Congress can make in the way the decision is made with the Joint Chiefs to keep the separate services' jealousies down to a minimum, more coordination?

Dr. Brzezinski had David Jones in his statement here augmenting the authority of the Chairman.

I wonder if you might expand on some of your ideas, Dr. Brzezinski, and General Scowcroft.

Is there any structural reform that we could take to deal with this problem which is so apparent it is not even worth discussing; I think you would not deny they are there.

Is there anything we can do about it?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. General Jones' proposals would involve some modes but, I think, very useful structural changes.

It seems to me we ought to move in the direction of making it attractive from a career point of view for our senior military officers to think in broader national security terms, to see their careers as above narrow-service concerns.

The development of, in effect, a group of senior officers who have an interservice orientation, who are strategically oriented and who find it rewarding just as a career pattern to be so, would be a very healthy development.

We have over the years tended to develop an officer corps starting with our service academies which is extraordinarily service oriented, which thinks in terms of the service first, almost automatically.

General Jones' proposals, I think, would involve a modest turnaway from that.

Senator QUAYLE. Would the permanent assignment to the Joint Chiefs be one way to sort of get—

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Permanent, I think would be the wrong word, but a major career step forward perhaps resulting in then continuous professional involvement in some interservice layer at the apex of the military hierarchy. I think it would be very useful.

It would also make possible something else which I feel is needed and which I felt for some time represented a major gap; namely, the development on a serious scale of professional, strategic military thinking.

We have extremely gifted officers, but we do not have a tradition of genuine, significant, strategic thought emanating from our military service.

In the postwar era, it has tended to be the civilian strategic thinkers who have attempted to shape our strategy. To some extent it has been creative; to some extent it has been divorced from actual experience in war fighting.

I would think that development of a more coordinated command structure and, therefore, also the layer of officers who have a strategic perspective would enhance our own thoughts on what are the proper national defense strategies and would create greater connectivity between innovative thought and fighting experience. I think some of our thinking has become too abstract, because of the gap that developed between strategic thinking and actual military experience.

General SCOWCROFT. I would move by steps in this area mostly because I think that the resistance being engendered by an attempt at wholesale change would prevent any move and there would be enormous resistance to change.

I think my ultimate solution would be to have all officers, once they reach the rank of general officer, promoted centrally. That is one I would not recommend at the moment because I think it would stop any progress.

I think the step of giving the Chairman decision authority, making the other members of the JCS, if you will, advisers would fundamentally change the structure.

I would turn the joint staff, which is a group of very able people, into an operating arm of the Chairman.

The services, rather than keeping their very top people in their own services to fight with the joint staff, would send their best people to the joint staff because that is where the decisions were being made.

I think that one very simple—I think it would require legislation—but one simple move to give the Chairman final decision authority over the concerns of the JCS would be a reasonable step forward and I think it could make an enormous difference.

Senator QUAYLE. So, many of the things that are outlined in the David Jones' proposal you would support?

General SCOWCROFT. I support General Jones' proposals.

As I say, I would step back at the moment from getting into promotion policies because those are the family jewels of the services and I think the outcry would make it very difficult to get anything done.

Senator QUAYLE. Again, I want to thank both of you gentlemen for your contribution today and the contribution you have made in public life.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Gentlemen, thank you both very much. I think this has been a very constructive hearing, very instructional to me. I think it will be an important body of the record that we are compiling here.

We are grateful to you for coming.

We will stand in recess until this afternoon at 2 p.m., when we will hear from Harold Brown, former Secretary of Defense.

Gentlemen, thank you.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Questions with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Brzezinski, how were long-range strategic goals or objectives formulated during the Carter Administration?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Under President Carter, the NSC coordinated the development of the longer-range strategic goals of the Administration. A basic outline of such goals was developed by me early in the Administration, and the document was then circulated and discussed with the President's principal foreign policy advisers. It then served as the basic guideline for our policies.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Brzezinski, our political system allows for rapid changes in Administrations which can bring about great changes in strategic objectives.

What strategic objectives do you feel are necessary that do not presently transcend political ideology?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. The central need is for continuity in our dealings with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is our principal adversary, and our management of that competition as well as conflict should not be subject to the vagaries of politics. I would favor the creation of some bipartisan commission to advise the President on U.S.-Soviet relations, though obviously the President has the ultimate responsibility for defining our policy.

Senator THURMOND. General Scowcroft, do you feel that creation of independent commissions to study certain security issues serves a useful defense planning function, or is it repetitious of stated objectives?

General SCOWCROFT. I am generally opposed to the creation of such Commissions, as a rule, but I certainly feel that they can serve a useful purpose in certain instances. I would not suggest that they be implemented except in very special circumstances.

[Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.]